This study provides new evidence regarding the effects of patent protection on international trade. It employs a gravity model of bilateral trade flows and estimates the effects of increased protection on a cross-section of 89x88 countries. It improves on previous studies in two respects. First, we estimate the gravity model for two different kind of aggregates: total non-fuel trade and high technology trade. Second, it addresses the problem of zero trade flows between countries by adopting a bivariate distributed probit regression model. Second, to measure the strength of IPRs regimes, we make use of a fine tuned index on national IPRs systems developed by Park and Ginarte (1996) . Our results confirm previous findings suggesting a positive link between IPRs protection and trade flows for the total non-fuel trade aggregate.
However, IPRs are not found to be significant for high technology trade flows.
1 These estimates are based on trade data from the UN Comtrade database. For the definition of high technology products, see Table 1. The next section provides a summary of theoretical considerations involved. Section III presents the estimation set-up. Section IV reports the results obtained. Section V compares our results to related studies. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. A review of the economics of trade-related intellectual property rights
The conventional economic rationale for the protection of IPRs in closed economies can be found in Arrow (1962) . Since knowledge is non-rival in nature, it should be freely available (apart from the cost of transmitting knowledge). If this were the case, however, the market would underinvest in the production of new knowledge, because innovators would not be able to recover their costs. By granting innovators the exclusive rights to commercialize their intellectual assets over a certain period of time, IPRs offer an incentive for the production of knowledge. In short, IPRs introduce a static distortion (i.e., access to proprietary knowledge is sold above its marginal cost), which is rationalized as an effective way to foster the dynamic benefits associated with innovative activities.
IPRs are territorial in character, that is, they are created by national laws and differ across countries.
If intellectual property embedded in goods and services originating in country A crosses the border to country B, two questions arise. First, how will IPRs protection in country B affect the magnitude of the bilateral trade flow from country A to B; and second what are the implications of such protection on economic welfare of both countries A and B.
Bilateral trade flows and differences in IPRs protection
IPRs affect international trade flows in several ways. A firm, for example, may be deterred to export its patented good into a foreign market, if potential "pirates" can diminish the profitability of the firm's activity in that market because of a weak IPRs regime. Accordingly, a strengthening of a country's patent regime would tend to increase imports as foreign firms would face increasing net demand for their products reflecting the displacement of pirates. On the other hand, a firm may choose to reduce its sales in a foreign market as a response to stronger IPRs protection because of its greater market power in an imitation safe environment. These opposing market-expansion and market-power effects imply that the overall effect of IPRs protection on bilateral trade flows is theoretically ambiguous (Maskus and Penubarti 1995) .
A further source of ambiguity stems from the fact that differing levels of IPRs protection may affect a firm's decision on its preferred mode of serving a foreign market. A firm may choose to serve a foreign market by foreign direct investment (FDI) or by licensing its intellectual asset to a foreign firm instead of exporting the product in an environment characterized by strong IPRs (Ferrantino 1993) . 3 Thus, strengthened IPRs protection may have a further negative effect on trade flows in this respect.
Welfare implications
The implications of tighter IPRs on economic welfare are highly complex. The simple fact that trade flows rise or fall in response to tighter IPRs is not sufficient for drawing conclusions regarding economic welfare. Both static and dynamic effects need to be considered. Moreover, in this paper, we are primarily concerned with the effects of IPRs on international trade flows. In a different paper (Primo Braga and Fink 1997) , we discuss how tighter IPRs affect economic welfare through FDI, the transfer of technology, and domestic R&D. The following paragraphs give a brief summary of the associated static and dynamic costs and benefits for two trading economies that may arise only in response to changes in trade flows fostered by stronger IPRs.
From a static, partial-equilibrium point of view, the source country of the trade flow is likely to gain from tighter protection, because it can capture increased monopoly profits from the sale of its goods abroad. In contrast, the static effects on the welfare of the destination country are likely to be negative: increased market power by foreign title holders leading to deadweight losses. 4 In this view, many small, innovation-consuming countries fear that increased patent protection will only lead to a rent transfer to developed, innovation-producing countries.
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From a static, general-equilibrium point of view, tighter IPRs tend to be further detrimental to the destination country of the trade flow because the reallocation of production, i.e. the shift of product lines 3 FDI as a mode of serving a foreign country is of special relevance because the existence of intangible assets such as intellectual property is a major rationale for the existence of (horizontally integrated) TNCs (Caves 1996) . The importance of FDI is also highlighted by the fact that in 1992 world wide sales of foreign affiliates (US$ 5,325 billion) exceeded global exports of goods and services (US$ 4,570 billion). See The World Bank (1996) for further details. 4 See, for example, Deardorff (1992) . Nogués (1993) , Maskus and Konan (1994) and Subramanian (1995) try to estimate these deadweight losses for the pharmaceutical industry in several developing countries. 5 This scenario assumes that the destination country is able to imitate the source countries' products in the absence of IPRs. If this is not the case, i.e. if technology is not freely available, the introduction of IPRs creates consumer surplus in the form of newly available products which may partly offset the deadweight loss. In this view, tighter IPRs are beneficial in that they transfer technology. from the destination country to the source country, worsens the terms of trade in favor of the source country. In addition, the reallocation of production may reduce welfare in both countries as efficiency considerations call for an allocation of manufacturing to the region with lower costs. 6 This effect may be of particular relevance if one recalls that most countries with weak IPRs are low-wage, developing countries.
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From a dynamic point of view, the introduction of IPRs stimulates innovation in the source country and thus increase future trade flows. This will be beneficial for both trading economies assuming that social returns on these innovations exceed private returns. 8 The international recognition of IPRs also can be seen as an adjustment mechanism which guarantees the functioning of dynamic competition between countries. Through IPRs, innovation producing countries have an incentive to develop new technologies which in their next generation are manufactured by follower countries. This mechanism thus leads to continued technological progress and economic growth and from a dynamic point of view is beneficial for both leaders and followers (Fisch and Speyer 1995) .
To sum up, the overall effect of IPRs protection on levels of bilateral trade flows is ambiguous.
From a static welfare point of view, IPRs can be viewed as a rent transfer mechanism which deteriorates the international allocation of production. Most studies conclude that the destination country looses from tighter protection whereas the source country is usually better off. 9 However, benefits of a dynamic nature can be identified for both trading partners. On average, it is not clear whether these dynamic benefits can compensate for the static losses in the countries strengthening their IPRs systems and whether tighter IPRs improve world economic welfare via their impact on trade flows. It is worth pointing out that these theoretical considerations may be moot in a world economy in which political economy considerations are clearly in favor of higher standards of protection. Helpman (1993) , who develops these conclusions from a dynamic general equilibrium model with two regions, one product, and one factor. 7 The welfare implications resulting from the reallocation of production may be partly offset by increased production via foreign subsidiaries (FDI).
8 Diwan and Rodrik (1991) , for example, show that a Southern, innovation-consuming country may have an incentive to protect patent rights, if it has a different distribution of preferences over the range of exploitable technologies and R&D resources in Northern, innovation-producing countries are scarce. 9 See, for example, Chin and Grossman (1988) , Deardorff (1991), and Helpman (1993) . 10 See, for example , Primo Braga (1996) for a discussion of the political economy in the context of the TRIPS negotiations.
III. Empirical analysis: the estimation set-up
To empirically estimate the effects of increased patent protection on bilateral trade flows we use a conventional gravity model. Gravity models have been applied successfully to explain different types of international flows, such as migration, commuting, recreational traffic, and trade. Typically, they specify that a flow from country i to country j can be explained by supply conditions in country i, by demand conditions in country j, and by forces either assisting or resisting the flow's movement.
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Our depend variables are bilateral trade flows for 89x88 countries which were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database. The data refer to 1989 total non-fuel and high technology trade. The rationale for using high technology trade flows besides total non-fuel trade is based on the a priori expectation that the effects of IPRs protection are stronger for knowledge-intensive trade. For a definition of our high technology aggregate, see Table 1 .
Following earlier specifications of gravity models, our explanatory variables are GDP and population of both countries i and j, geographical distance between the two countries, a dummy variable which is one if the two countries share a common border and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable which is one if the two countries share the same language and zero otherwise. 12 The coefficients on GDP are expected to be positive and around unity (Anderson 1979) ; the coefficients on population are expected to be small and negative, representing economies of scales (Linneman 1966) . Positive geographic and cultural distance are expected to have a negative influence on bilateral trade flows; that is the coefficient on geographical distance is expected to be negative, the coefficients on common border and language are expected to be positive. The data appendix gives more information on the countries included and the sources of all variables.
11 Gravity models were developed based on intuitive reasoning rather than economic modeling. Due to their empirical success, there have been numerous attempts to shed some light on the economic underpinnings of the gravity equation. Linneman (1966) showed how the standard gravity equation can be derived from a quasiWalrasian general equilibrium model of export supply and import demand. Leamer and Stern (1970) showed how a gravity model can be derived from a probability model of trade patterns. Anderson (1979) suggested a theoretical foundation in terms of an expenditure system with goods differentiated by countries of origin. Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) used a general equilibrium world trade model assuming utility-and profit-maximizing agent behavior and showed that the gravity model "fits in" with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of inter-industry trade and the Helpman-Krugman-Markusen models of intra-industry trade.
To capture the effects of preferential trading agreements, we also include separate dummy variables for the European Community (EC), the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), the Latin American Integration Association/Latin American Free Trade Association (LAIA/LAFTA), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Central American Common Market (CACM). We expect positive coefficient on these five dummy variables.
Finally, to capture the effect of intellectual property rights on bilateral trade flows we use the IPRs index developed by Park and Ginarte (1996) . 13 This index grades national IPRs regimes of 110 countries on a scale from zero to five. To compute a country's ranking, Park and Ginarte (1996) create five different categories -extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. For each category, they use several benchmark criteria (e.g. patentability of pharmaceuticals for extent of coverage) and compute the share of "fulfilled" criteria. A country's score is the unweigthed sum of these shares over all categories. 14 The
United States receives the highest score with 4.52; several countries without patent laws (e.g., Angola, Burma, Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea) receive a score of 0.
A common problem regarding the estimation of bilateral trade flows is that some flows are reported as zero because countries do not trade with each other. For example, in our data set on average about 26% of the total non fuel trade flows and 53% of high technology trade flows are zero. A standard log-linear model with a log-normally distributed error term cannot, by definition, explain these zero trade flows.
Simple exclusion of zero trade flows would lead to a potential sample selection bias. There are several ways how to address this problem. We follow Bikker and de Vos (1992) , who propose a bivariate normally distributed probit regression. 15 The model consists of an equation for the probability of zero observations and an equation for the magnitude of a positive action: 
IV. Empirical Estimates
Our estimation results are presented in Tables The estimated correlation coefficients between the probit and gravity equations ∃ ρ are always close to zero and not statistically significant based on a likelihood ratio test for both total non-fuel and high technology trade. This suggests that for our data it would have been possible to estimate the equations independently and that the exclusion of zero observations in the gravity equation does not lead to a bias stemming from a non-random sample selection.
Recalling the theoretical ambiguity of the effect of IPRs on bilateral trade described in Section II, we had no prior expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient on the Park and Ginarte index. For both total non-fuel imports and exports, the Park and Ginarte index has only a small effect on the probability of positive trade flows between countries, although the effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for total non-fuel exports. Turning to the gravity equation, IPRs have a significantly positive impact on bilateral trade flows for both total non-fuel imports and exports. Comparisons of models (I) and (II) in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that inclusion of IPRs leads to relatively small changes in the coefficients of most gravity variables. The biggest changes occur in the coefficients on GDP and population of the destination country of the trade flow. These changes can be explained by the strong correlation between the strength of this type of specification error may bias our estimated results.
V. Comparisons to related studies
There are several related studies which also try to estimate the effects of intellectual property rights on bilateral trade flows. 18 Maskus and Konan (1994) also use a gravity model to estimate the effect of IPRs protection on bilateral trade. They regress the index developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) A potential problem in Maskus and Penubarti's estimation lies in the way they interact the Rapp and Rozek index with dummy variables for small and large developing countries. As mentioned previously, the strength of patent protection tends to be strongly correlated with the level of economic development.
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Through interaction with the two dummies, the Rapp and Rozek index is allowed a much more flexible impact than GNP per capita. Hence, it may be that the three coefficients estimated for the Rapp and Rozek index pick up a misspecification in the functional form of GNP per capita. Their estimated coefficient on GNP per capita is not significantly different from zero for most cases, which they attribute to the notion of homothetic preferences. Unfortunately, they do not report estimation results without interacting the Rapp and Rozek index with dummies; it is thus difficult to evaluate the seriousness of this potential problem in
Maskus and Penubarti's study.
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VI. Summary and Conclusion
With an increasing share of knowledge-intensive products in international trade and the inclusion of trade-related IPRs on the agenda of the GATT/WTO, IPRs have become an important trade issue.
Political economy considerations --as reflected in the TRIPS Agreement --favor higher standards of IPRs protection.
22 Maskus and Penubarti (1995) report a correlation coefficient of 0.712 between the Rapp and Rozek index and GNP per capita. 23 We also estimated our gravity model in a similar way as Maskus and Penubarti (1995) . Instead of the Park and Ginarte index, we used the Rapp and Rozek index interacted with three dummies for high income countries, large developing countries, and small developing countries. Our estimated coefficients were similar: we find a significantly positive IPRs-trade link for large developing countries. However, inclusion of the Rapp and Rozek index interacted with the three dummies lead to large changes in the coefficients on GDP and population. We concluded that the relatively more flexible impact of IPRs in our model indeed picks up a misspecification in the functional form of per capita income and therefore abandoned this approach.
Economic analysis suggests that the effects of IPRs protection on bilateral trade flows are theoretically ambiguous. Because of the complex static and dynamic considerations related to a policy of tighter protection, it is difficult to generate normative recommendations. When estimating the effects of IPRs protection in a gravity model of bilateral trade flows, our empirical results suggest that, on average, higher levels of protection have significantly positive impact on non-fuel trade. However, this result is not confirmed when confining the estimation to high technology goods where we found IPRs to have no statistically significant impact.
More empirical research is needed to gain more insight regarding the IPRs-trade link, especially at industry and firm level. The challenge of such research will be to find 'natural experiments' to overcome the colineraty and endogeneity problems of the cross-country type of analyses like the present study. One alternative, for instance, would be to consider a country which at some point in the past significantly changed its system of IPRs and to test for structural change. A further important field of research is to examine the impact of tighter IPRs on FDI and their interplay with trade flows. Table 1 ) is asymptotically chi-square distributed.
Similarly, the joint statistical significance of all explanatory variables can be tested by restricting all coefficients (except the coefficients on the intercepts) to zero and computing the corresponding likelihood ratio.
